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Abstract 
The article explores aspects of the notion of forms of life in the 
Wittgensteinian tradition especially following Iris Murdoch’s lead. On 
the one hand, the notion signals the hardness and inexhaustible 
character of reality, as the background needed in order to make sense 
of our lives in various ways. On the other, the hardness of reality is the 
object of a moral work of apprehension and deepening to the point at 
which its distinctive character dissolves into the family of connections 
we have gained for ourselves. The two movements of thought are 
connected and necessary. 
 
1. Approaches to forms of life 
In this paper I will explore aspects of the notion of forms of life in 
the Wittgensteinian tradition especially following Iris Murdoch’s 
lead. I will start though with a brief remark about Amartya Sen. Sen 
distinguishes between approaches based on what he calls 
“transcendental institutionalism” and those based on “realization-
focused comparison” (2009: 7). He argues that transcendental 
institutionalism “concentrates its attention on what it identifies as 
perfect justice”. “It tries only to identify social characteristics that 
cannot be transcended in terms of justice, and its focus is thus not 
on comparing feasible societies, all of which may fall short of the 
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ideals of perfection”. “Second, in searching for perfection, 
transcendental institutionalism concentrates primarily on getting 
the institutions right, and it is not directly focused on the actual 
societies that would ultimately emerge” (2009: 5-6). Following and 
reformulating Sen’s distinction we can speak about approaches 
which require that we know in advance the ideals of perfection as 
these relate to conduct and to value and which are not interested in 
the “actual behaviours of people and their social interactions” 
(2009: 6). The notion of forms of life can be used within this kind 
of approach. In this case it works in order to advance such a 
perfect theory of justice, or virtue, or the good life.1 
Conversely, there are approaches which do not hold that one 
begins one’s moral reflection from a perfect theory (Sen himself 
argues that this is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to 
engage in moral and political thought), and which arrive at 
judgments from assessments that require a detailed knowledge of 
the situations under consideration. In these judgments the description 
of the situation is of particular relevance. To take an example given 
by Sen, if we wish to argue, say, for the superiority of a painting by 
Van Gogh over one by Picasso “we do not need to get steamed up 
about identifying the most perfect picture in the world, which 
would beat the Van Goghs and the Picassos and all other paintings 
in the world” (2009: 101). What is relevant on the other hand is 
description and comparison, and these are clearly steeped in culture 
and judgment.  
We can employ the notion of forms of life within the latter kind 
of approach, and in this case it will be of no help to us to 
determine those criteria which will allow us to apply a general 
theory to particular situations, instead what will help us is to seek a 
direct encounter with those concrete situations. More generally we 
can say, with Wittgenstein, that our thought (not just moral 
thought) has to do with movements that are internal to forms of 
life – as he writes: “to imagine a language means to imagine a form 
                                                          
1 Moments in Martha Nussbaum’s elaboration of the capability approach seem to fit into 
this perspective. Metaphysical Aristotelianism is also an example (though this latter is hard 
to identify; we may perhaps take as examples those of Philippa Foot and Michael 
Thompson). 
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of life” (2009: §19) –, movements that Stanley Cavell has taught us 
to visualize both in their vertical dimension, in connection with 
what is most “natural” in human forms of life, and in their 
horizontal dimension, linked to what is most “social” (Cavell 1989). 
These are movements through which we explore and reflect on the 
forms of life that are the context of our activities and relationships, 
and on the other hand they are movements through which we 
transform, through reflection and conduct, the forms of life 
themselves. I have given here just a few indications of a general 
approach by using the distinction put forward by Sen. I wish to 
discuss now a specific approach, one which has its roots in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and which has been further developed 
by authors influenced by him and who have themselves become 
classics, such as Cavell, Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond.  
2. Iris Murdoch  
I will begin with some observations on the notion of forms of life 
in this approach – starting from a development present in the 
thought of Iris Murdoch – in which the central notions are those of 
background or framework, or that of the larger structure of reality in which 
our words, thoughts, choices, and our lives themselves have a 
place. As I will try to show these are concepts that are also 
congenial to a wider reflection on forms of life.  
Following the thread of Murdoch’s argument this paper will be 
dedicated to throwing light on a particular problem. Murdoch helps 
us to understand that a background is the terrain of our thoughts 
and behaviors against which they unfold, yet at the same time it 
constitutes the active space of our lives, where such thoughts and 
behaviors have their being, and as such it dissolves as mere background 
that sets up a contrast between it and us, and appears to us instead 
rather as the articulation of who we are and what we do. 
3. Background as contrast 
Let us begin to consider the first aspect of the notion of 
background, which is linked to a particular type of realism for 
which the world – considered as the object and the source of our 
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attention, our sensibility and our moral conduct – is outside of 
ourselves and resists us. Above all, it is not the fruit of our desires 
and fantasies. As Iris Murdoch writes: 
One might start from the assertion that morality, goodness, is a form 
of realism. The idea of a really good man living in a private dream 
world seems unacceptable. Of course a good man may be infinitely 
eccentric, but he must know certain things about his surroundings, 
most obviously the existence of other people and their claims. The 
chief enemy of excellence in morality (and also in art) is personal 
fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandising and consoling wishes and 
dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one. 
(1998c: 347-48) 
This idea of the hardness of the object of morality, of the 
experience of others, of the reality of the external world, lies at the 
root of the important notion of the independence of others, of the 
world and of things, and hence the conception that moral 
reflection is exercised on something that resists it, something 
marked by its profundity, something that leads this moral work 
along a potentially indefinite path. This is because the reality of the 
world and of others is not simply outside of us, on the surface, it is 
not a reality that we can grasp without entering, with difficulty, into 
that world that is not immediately our own world. 
In discussing the philosophy of G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica, 
Murdoch writes: 
Good is indefinable not for the reasons offered by Moore’s 
successors, but because of the infinite difficulty of the task of 
apprehending a magnetic but inexhaustible reality. […] If 
apprehension of good is apprehension of the individual and the real, 
the good partakes of the infinite elusive character of reality. (1998b: 
333-34) 
Here Murdoch defends an image of moral thought as a form of 
knowledge and of sensibility that has an object and is independent 
of us, with regard to which we must try to overcome a natural 
inclination to act upon it according to our own interests and 
projections. In view of this she cites Freud because, as she says, 
Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. He sees 
the psyche as an egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy, whose 
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natural attachments are sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to 
understand or control. […] Objectivity and unselfishness are not 
natural to human beings (1998c: 341). 
Murdoch indicates here that there are contexts in which it is 
precisely the otherness of others, their diversity and separateness, 
that is at the origin of the type of moral density and thickness 
which we inhabit when we reflect on other human beings, on 
animals and on nature. They are for us the sources of requests, 
duties or scruples, but also, and importantly, of a sense of value 
that takes the form of the mere contemplation of something 
profound and full of meaning. As she writes: “The more the 
separateness and differentness of other people is realised, and the 
fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as 
one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing” 
(1998c: 353-54). But this is true for the rest of the world also, not 
just for other human beings. Murdoch is critical of the romantic 
pleasure in nature which takes possession of it for our own 
purposes. For her what is crucial is instead that “we take a self-
forgetful pleasure in the sheer alien pointless independent existence 
of animals, birds, stones and trees” (1998d: 369-70). This type of 
pleasure is able to free us from a centripetal concentration on our 
own ego, allowing us to appreciate external reality in its 
independence from our desires and our need for consolation and 
reassurance, in its subjection to necessity and to chance. For 
Murdoch: “We are what we seem to be, transient mortal creatures 
subject to necessity and chance. That is to say that there is, in my 
view, no God in the traditional sense of that term; and the 
traditional sense is perhaps the only sense” (1998d: 365). She also 
writes: 
The Good has nothing to do with purpose, indeed it excludes the idea 
of purpose. “All is vanity” is the beginning and the end of ethics. The 
only genuine way to be good is to be good “for nothing” in the midst 
of a scene where every “natural” thing, including one’s own mind, is 
subject to chance, that is, to necessity (1998c: 358). 
Here chance and necessity denote the harshness of a world from 
which we can draw no consolation. Nonetheless, this harshness is 
evoked here to remind us of a reality that is infinitely difficult to 
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reach, and yet at the same time is internal to our capacity for 
transformation and improvement. In this perspective, Murdoch’s 
reflection (in its own way) belongs to the philosophical genre that 
Cavell calls moral perfectionism and more largely to the 
philosophical genre of the art of living. But I would like to note 
here that Murdoch’s rejection of a conception of nature as a source 
of consolation and tranquillity, in all its countless and disorderly 
manifestations, distances her from the classical uses of nature in 
spiritual exercises, either Stoic or Epicurean (say, Seneca and 
Lucretius). 
Murdoch’s polemical target, however, is closer to us. She does 
not want such a contrast between the world and our moral work to 
be represented in Kantian or Romantic terms. She reads these latter 
perspectives as a form of self-indulgence, not as self-discipline, that 
is as a narcissistic exaltation in which otherness is functional to 
reassurance (this is her understanding of Kant’s sublime). The 
moral attitudes she wishes to endorse are those “which emphasize 
the inexhaustible detail of the world, the endlessness of the task of 
understanding, the importance of not assuming that one has got 
individuals and situations ‘taped’ […]” (1998a: 87). “The difficulty 
is to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent 
it from returning surreptitiously to the self with consolations of 
self-pity, resentment, fantasy and despair. […] It is a task to come 
to see the world as it is” (1998d: 375).  
The work of moral reflection is thus centered on the 
understanding of the world, a world which is not constituted by 
humanly and morally neutral facts in respect of which morality can 
be represented as a ring that encloses a certain area of independent 
facts within a given perimeter, attributing to them a special moral 
property. As Murdoch writes: “a moral concept seems less like a 
movable and extensible ring laid down to cover a certain area of 
fact, and more like a total difference of Gestalt. We differ not only 
because we select different objects out of the same world but 
because we see different worlds” (1998a: 82). Here, many different 
questions are brought together, but I wish to draw particular 
attention to the characterization of moral work that emerges, as 
work of deepening and conceptual reorganization focusing on the 
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understanding of the world, that is to say, of the worlds. It is a 
struggle against the obstacles of fantasy, of the need for 
consolation and of the centripetal forces of egotism, a struggle 
aided by certain techniques (another signal of the correspondence of 
her thought with the philosophical genre of the art of living and of 
moral perfectionism), among which she mentions prayer and the 
experience of beauty. 
4. Human life 
I would now like to begin to show how this contrast between the 
ego and the outside world, characterized as “permanent 
background” (Murdoch, 1998c: 343), is able to explain important 
areas of moral thought, and two significant types of moral 
consideration in particular. The first is linked to a sense of human 
commonality, the second to a kind of respect driven by a sense of 
animal and human life as estranged and foreign.  
Let us start with the first type of consideration. We can be 
struck by the independence and autonomy of life, that sets it apart 
from what emanates from our subjective ego, and yet it is precisely 
this characteristic of life that can create a human bond or solidarity. 
I will give two examples. 
(1) I would like to start with a citation from Javier Cercas’s 
novel, Soldiers of Salamis. It is a remarkable passage in which the 
Republican troops are in flight from Barcelona in 1939, heading for 
the French borders, and a group of them decide to execute some 
Nationalist prisoners. One of them escapes – a leader of the fascist 
Falange, Sánchez Mazas – and a Republican soldier follows him, 
but in the end he decides to spare him. Cercas describes this 
Republican soldier’s encounter with Mazas, who is hiding in a 
ditch, staring at the soldier who has found him, waiting for the 
bullet that will finish him off : 
The soldier is looking at him; Sánchez Mazas is looking at the soldier, 
but his weak eyes don’t understand what they see: beneath the sodden 
hair and wide forehead and eyebrows covered in raindrops the 
soldier’s look doesn’t express compassion or hatred, or even disdain, 
but a kind of secret or unfathomable joy, something verging on 
cruelty, something that resists reason, but nor is it instinct, something 
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that remains there with the same blind stubbornness with which blood 
persists in its course and the earth in its immovable orbit and all 
beings in their obstinate condition of being, something that eludes 
words the way water in the stream eludes stone, because words are 
only made for saying to each other, for saying the sayable, when the 
sayable is everything except what rules us or makes us live or matters 
or what we are or what this anonymous defeated soldier is, who now 
looks at this man whose body almost blends in with the earth and the 
brown water in the ditch, and who calls out loudly without ever taking 
his eyes off him: 
“There’s nobody over here!” 
Then he turns and walks away. (Cercas 2003: 95-96) 
In Cercas’ description, everything that rules us and makes us live is 
in solidarity with that body merging with the muddy ditch. It is the 
thread of life, at its most impersonal that – responding to a 
fundamental necessity, above or below ordinary morality – gains 
the upper hand. It is a thread woven from circumstances, in which 
the war has united two enemies, two people who are fighting for 
opposing ideals, one for freedom, the other for fascism. It is not 
that moral principles draw a gesture of solidarity towards the fascist 
from the Republican combatant, nor is it a sense of humanity, it is 
the joyous and cruel recognition of the course of life, of how 
“blood persists in its course and the earth in its immovable orbit 
and all beings in their obstinate condition of being”. It is this 
independence of human life and of the entire cosmos from our 
interests and ideals that weaves the horizon of this choice. 
(2) Another example in a similar vein – that has made an 
impression on more than one philosopher – is to be found in 
Dickens, Our Mutual Friend. The wicked Rogue Riderhood, having 
rowed out on the Thames in thick fog, is hit by another boat and 
ends up in the river. Half drowned, his body already stiffening, he 
is carried to the pub and a doctor is called. Dickens writes: 
No one has the least regard for the man; with them all, he has been an 
object of avoidance, suspicion, and aversion; but the spark of life 
within him is curiously separable from himself now, and they have a 
deep interest in it, probably because it is life, and they are living and 
must die. […] 
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See! A token of life! An indubitable token of life! The spark may 
smoulder and go out, or it may glow and expand, but see! The four 
rough fellows, seeing, shed tears. Neither Riderhood in this world, nor 
Riderhood in the other, could draw tears from them; but a striving 
human soul between the two can do it easily. (Dickens 1998, Ch. 36) 
Cora Diamond remarks on this passage that it shows “the sense of 
death as our common enemy, an enemy of a special and terrible 
sort” (1990: 170). In a way that recalls the passage from Cercas, 
here life and death appear to us as beyond our reach, but at the 
same time as drawing us together, as the source of the moral force 
that moves Dickens’ characters to struggle for the life of a man for 
whom they felt only contempt. Gilles Deleuze was also struck by 
this passage, seeing it as the supreme expression of the idea of life 
construed as pure immanence, a life without name or personality, 
but which enraptures us and draws us together: “Between his life 
and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing 
with death” (2001: 28). In this passage, as in Diamond’s and 
Deleuze’s comments on it, and in the passage from Cercas, to have 
a life appears as that type of reality that Murdoch wishes to defend 
from the ego’s demands to incorporate all reality into its network 
of centripetal sentiments, claiming instead the distance of reality 
from this. Nonetheless, it is precisely this sense of reality that 
resists our desire for incorporation that is at the root of a 
commonality that touches human sympathy and morality.  
5. Nature in its indifference 
In these examples, the life that strikes us in its autonomy – the 
“blind stubbornness with which blood persists in its course and the 
earth in its immovable orbit and all beings in their obstinate 
condition of being”, as Cercas puts it – is at the root of a regained 
sense of bonds and of solidarity. I would now like to present some 
examples in which the harshness of reality produces a different 
type of moral response.  
One example comes from Werner Herzog’s film-documentary 
Grizzly Man (2005), where the director reworks and comments on 
the footage of the explorer and environmentalist, Timothy 
Treadwell who, driven by his love of grizzly bears, spent thirteen 
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summers filming them in Alaska. This love led Treadwell to a tragic 
end, when he and his fiancée were killed and partly eaten by a bear, 
in front of his camera, which was still filming. Herzog thematizes 
the non-human ferocity of the grizzlies. As he says in the voice-
over: “What haunts me is that in all the faces of all the bears that 
Treadwell has ever filmed I discover no kinship, no understanding, 
no mercy, I see only the overwhelming indifference of nature. To 
me there is no such thing as a secret world of the bears. […] but 
for Timothy Treadwell this bear was a friend, a savior”.  
At the end of the film, Herzog remarks: “While we watch the 
animals in their choice of being, in their grace and ferociousness, a 
thought becomes more and more clear, that it is not so much a 
look at wild nature as it is an insight into ourselves, our nature”. 
The concept of the distance and of the independence of external 
reality, of nature, and of animals, and at root also of our own 
nature, here takes on a different hue. What freezes the blood is the 
vision of an external reality that we cannot control, nor even grasp 
completely through the intellect or the imagination. However, this 
is telling us something we need to know, as inhabitants of this 
planet in which we live with animals like grizzly bears, and it is the 
fact that this world is in the end a world that is extraneous to us. 
The bears seem to share many things with us, like eating, playing, 
washing, but in the weave of these activities what emerges is their 
crushing disinterest in us, that renders them so utterly extraneous, 
animals in whose eyes we cannot find our own sentiments. And 
further, this glimpse into the extraneity of the grizzlies is also a 
glimpse into our own animal nature, that is to say, into our nature 
as seen from the outside, which appears to us as indifferent and 
alien, bone-chilling and mysterious. I could offer many examples in 
which our own nature strikes us as extraneous and indifferent, but I 
would just like to mention one type of example that has to do with 
illness. In illness, particularly in long-term illnesses that lead to 
death – those that leave us with time to think and to find ways to 
live with them, in effect to be changed by them – we may 
experience something similar to what appears in the examples 
given above. The illness may bring with it a striking sense of our 
animality, we become aware of just how much we are animals, 
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vulnerable, mortal, perishable, and we experience the unbridgeable 
distance between this and our sense of ourselves as authors of our 
own lives and actors in the world. I will come back to the question 
of vulnerability, which is a huge issue, but for now I would just like 
to underline that vulnerability can be portrayed as something 
impossible to think. 
There is a long tradition of moral thought that considers human 
dignity and individual freedom as incompatible with the 
contingency of goods and of external conditions, including, 
primarily, that of our own bodies. What I am suggesting here is that 
this conception could be not only false but could also indicate a 
deep human inclination to avoid a truth that is hard to make our own. 
But it is precisely this inclination to avoidance – which 
characterizes our experience of mortality and of human animality – 
that is the ground of a new experience of ourselves, in which it is 
the dramatic independence of our bodies that gives meaning to our 
lives. 
To recapitulate: that the world is at one and the same time the 
place we live in, our home, and a strange and frightening place; that 
the other animals are our companions in the adventure of life and 
at the same time overwhelmingly indifferent to us, sometimes 
interested in eating us; that our life itself can strike us as extraneous 
and indifferent in contrast with the comfort we draw from the 
personal and social sense we have of ourselves, these types of 
lessons about the world, animals, and life itself, are accessible to us 
precisely because we manage to hold on to the objectivity of reality, 
in all its harshness, setting aside the desire for consolation and 
reassurance. It is this sense of a reality external to us that drives our 
moral participation.  
To go back to Iris Murdoch, it is important to learn “how real 
things can be looked at and loved without being seized and used, 
without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self. 
This exercise of detachment is difficult and valuable whether the 
thing contemplated is a human being or the root of a tree or the 
vibration of a colour or a sound” (1998c: 353).  
Piergiorgio Donatelli  CC-BY 
 54 
6. Dissolving permanent backgrounds 
At this point we need to explore the other side of the concept of 
permanent background. In fact, the deepening of our sense of 
reality required in the moral work described by Murdoch tends to 
dismantle the idea of reality described here as the type of otherness 
that engenders the range of moral sentiments that reveal to us 
nature, others and ourselves as important, profound and 
meaningful. This is because as we deepen our knowledge of the 
forms of life, this otherness tends to dissolve as a permanent 
background and to reappear as a bundle of relations and 
interconnections. Other existences, the environment, our own 
nature, become the forms of life of which we are part in virtue of 
the connections that we have established.  
The forms of life, the permanent backgrounds, to which we 
respond are constituted of conceptual organizations, of the mass of 
connections that link activities, individuals, attitudes, sentiments, 
facts and many other things. Moral work therefore also has to do 
with the progressive attempt to deepen our knowledge of these 
conceptual organizations, in accordance with their various 
ramifications, as they are the backgrounds (plural) that can come 
into contact with each other and interweave. Murdoch is of help to 
us (as are the other authors in this tradition) precisely because she 
does not separate, but rather joins together, the thesis of the 
independence of reality with that regarding the moral work of its 
apprehension. The deepening apprehension of the conceptual 
background, of the reality of others, of nature and of the world, is 
at the same time also a way in which we are transformed, together 
with the world in which we participate and explore. In discovering 
connections and making them our own we elaborate and render 
accessible new forms of life in which the initial reality loses its 
sense of distance and hardness so that we may reclaim it as a field 
of possibilities.  
As Wittgenstein writes, it is only against the background of the 
“bustle” of life, of the flux of life, that we speak of actions, react, 
and use concepts: “The background is the bustle of life” (1980: 
625). And he adds: 
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How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by showing 
the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed-up together. 
Not what one man is doing now, but the whole hurly-burly [Gewimmel], 
is the background against which we see an action, and it determines 
our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions (1980: §629). 
The bustle of life shows what is important for us, it is a pattern 
where what is significant keeps recurring with variations 
(Wittgenstein 1980: §672). But reflection through which we notice 
what is important, and the fact that it might not be so for other 
people, brings forth the sense of possibility. The connections we 
make, the spontaneous agreement and sympathy we find between 
things, are now gained, acknowledged, as the possibility that things 
agree differently, the possibility to live with different concepts 
(Wittgenstein 1980: §§638-40, 699). In realizing this, what was 
perceived as the bustle of life, against which actions, reactions, 
language and thought are determined, transforms into the space of 
the connections we make, into the appreciations of what is 
important, of what matters to us, and thus into to the space of 
possibility, of thought and action. The background transforms, as it 
were, into the foreground, of what offers itself to our attention (cf. 
Wittgenstein 1980: §725). 
I will now look at a few examples to make this point clear.  
7. Animals and the transformation of forms of life 
I would like to return to the question of our relationship with 
animals. Again in this context Diamond’s work will be very useful 
in helping us to develop this theme. In some of her essays, and in 
particular in “Eating Meat and Eating People” and in “The 
Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy”, Diamond 
elaborates the point I wish to discuss here with great perspicuity. In 
her essay “Eating Meat and Eating People” she shows how moral 
thought proceeds by going more deeply into our knowledge of 
what it means for an animal to have a life. Doing this is possible for 
us because of the existence of a permanent background, in 
Murdoch’s terms, involving the concept of animal, a concept which 
is constituted from a mass of responses, reactions, perceptions, 
activities, and relations that may be incoherent among themselves, 
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but this mass has enough order to allow us to think, on each 
occasion, of these diverse beings as animals, and, at the same time, to 
establish families of connections that account for the differences 
we determine among, for example, animals we see as companions, 
like dogs and cats; harmful animals, like rats and mosquitoes; wild 
animals like grizzly bears; and animals that we eat. These latter may 
be seen as animals that have been raised in a way respectful of their 
lives – in traditional farms, for example – or alternatively as animals 
treated in such a way that it is hard to speak of them as such, even 
for the workers who handle them, even though they are actually 
chickens or pigs. So this incoherent mass of activities, perceptions 
and attitudes constitutes nonetheless a sufficiently unitary 
background to allow us to find in it diverse conceptual orderings. 
As Wittgenstein writes: “If a concept depends on a pattern of life, 
then there must be some indefiniteness in it. For if a pattern 
deviates from the norm, what we want to say here would become 
quite dubious” (Wittgenstein 1980: §652). For example, we 
recognize immediately, in pets, beings that have a life to which we 
wish to attribute many of the characteristics that we generally 
attribute to the humans who live with them; or, watching  
documentaries and learning from primatology studies, we may 
come to feel very close to the great apes. 
These possibilities of thought, which belong to the work of 
apprehension of the reality of certain animals, the reality of their 
individual existences, consist in the capacity to establish 
connections. We connect the concept that we have of certain 
behaviors that are part of their lives with aspects of our own lives. 
In this way, we read in them certain traits which we consider it 
appropriate to respond with, say, a sense of concern, or of 
solidarity or respect – responses that we cultivate towards other 
human beings. In so doing, however, we are transformed. The 
concept of ourselves as human beings is transformed, because it is 
not a case of attributing characteristics to beings as if we were 
situated on a separate plane from them (this is the image proposed 
by traditional animalist ethics, as in the well-known theories of 
Peter Singer and Tom Regan, and more generally by 
“transcendental” approaches, in Sen’s terms). As we acquire 
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awareness of these connections (in thought and feeling, and in 
some or all of the threads that woven together form the mass of 
responses which constitute a conceptual framework), our sense of 
what these lives are for us changes, and along with it our sense of 
what we are in our own eyes also changes. In other words, these 
conceptual movements modify the forms of life and therefore 
modify both the concept we have of animals and that of ourselves: 
this latter being redefined now, in part, by the relationship we have 
recognized with certain animals.  
In her essay “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of 
Philosophy”, Diamond discusses the difficult and risky work of 
Elizabeth Costello, the character in J.M. Coetzee’s book of the 
same name. Costello’s work consists in showing what happens to 
animals in our world, in the course of which she exposes herself as 
a wounded animal. Here I’d like to recall instead another of 
Coetzee’s novels, Disgrace, in which the elaboration of a closeness 
to dogs is realized through a connection with their dead bodies. 
The main character, David, after being driven out of his lectureship 
in disgrace, begins to help an acquaintance (Bev Shaw) in a 
veterinary clinic:  
His whole being is gripped by what happens in the theatre. He is 
convinced the dogs know their time has come. Despite the silence and 
the painlessness of the procedure, despite the good thoughts that Bev 
Shaw thinks and that he tries to think, despite the airtight bags in 
which they tie the newmade corpses, the dogs in the yard smell what is 
going on inside (1999: 143). 
But it is David’s reaction to the way the dogs’ bodies are disposed 
of, that I want to comment on. Coetzee writes: 
Since Bev Shaw is the one who inflicts the needle, it is he who takes 
charge of disposing of the remains. The morning after each killing 
session he drives the loaded kombi to the grounds of Settlers Hospital, 
to the incinerator, and there consigns the bodies in their black bags to 
the flames. 
It would be simpler to cart the bags to the incinerator immediately 
after the session and leave them there for the incinerator crew to 
dispose of. But that would mean leaving them on the dump with the 
rest of the weekend’s scourings: with waste from the hospital wards, 
carrion scooped up at the roadside, malodorous refuse from the 
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tannery – a mixture both casual and terrible. He is not prepared to 
inflict such dishonour upon them. 
[…] 
Why has he taken on this job? To lighten the burden on Bev Shaw? 
For that it would be enough to drop off the bags at the dump and 
drive away. For the sake of the dogs? But the dogs are dead; and what 
do dogs know of honour and dishonour anyway?  
For himself, then. For his idea of the world, a world in which men do 
not use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for 
processing (1999: 144, 145-46). 
The connection that David makes with the dead bodies of the dogs 
arises from the mass of responses in which he participates and 
which tie him to the life of the dogs as companion animals, but he 
goes beyond this and makes a further connection that has to do 
with their dead bodies, in which he reads the sense of the gravity 
and the solemnity of the death of human beings. In so doing, 
however, he does not just bring the dogs into the human world, he 
also transforms his human world: he awakes for himself, and for 
those who share his sensibility, the sense of human vulnerability 
and of the importance of the fact that there is someone to attend to 
our dead bodies, just as he attends to those of the dogs. The 
relationship he has made his own with the dead dogs as bodies 
whose honor must be saved transforms him, and offers a 
transformed sense of what it means to be human to those who 
share his vision. 
We, as readers, may also recognize ourselves as animals for 
whom it is right that our remains be taken care of by others. But 
our recognition of this does not derive from the reassuring notion 
that this is somehow due to human beings (as we might think in 
the wake of ethical theories such as those of the Stoics or Kant or 
Rawls), it is rather a question of what is due to animals like dogs 
and like ourselves. We come to see ourselves through a different lens, 
and thus we redefine ourselves in relation to the life of animals 
such as dogs to the point where the sharing of bodily mortality is 
included. In conclusion, the way in which animals are close to us is 
seen to transform the sense of what it means to be human: it 
means being adventurous, playful, bodily vulnerable. It means that 
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we share the having of a body. This conception of the body is not 
the one hidden, as it were, when we feel ourselves to be subjects 
(authors, actors) who speak, act, and engage in a whole series of 
activities that do in fact set us apart from most other animals (as 
they set us apart from many other human beings), it is instead the 
body that experiences pleasure and suffering and death, like that of 
an animal, like David’s dogs.  
In this work of apprehension and deepening, David’s dogs are 
not a hard and ungraspable reality, they have had a role in 
redefining his own life and they are now a fundamental part of the 
connections that have molded the new human horizon in which he 
lives. The vulnerability that has been won and that he has made his 
own is no longer something that is impossible to think. At the same 
time, however, David’s dogs could have such a role because their 
reality was not absorbed by the centripetal forces (in Murdoch’s 
terms) of our projections; rather, David worked on the sense of 
their distance and the sense of respect due to independent 
existences to the point of changing and reshaping his vision and his 
life. 
8. Conclusion 
As we have seen, this is not an easy task, and the difficulty, or what 
may be perceived as an impossibility, marks out one type of human 
reaction and of moral thought. In the first series of examples 
discussed, the sense of the importance of human life, of animals 
and the world, as independent entities that we may not take 
possession of, derives from the perception that it is impossible for 
us to establish connections with them. Nonetheless, if we did 
succeed in establishing such connections the sense of otherness 
would be lost, but in its place we would gain different relationships 
and a different range of moral sentiments.  
In the example of Treadwell and the grizzlies, if we were able to 
fully share, with regard to many non-human animals, our sense of 
animality, this bond would redefine us and would cease to appear 
strange and alien, that is, to appear to us as a background against 
which we move as human beings belonging to an independent plane 
of existence. In the same way, the sense of a common identity and 
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the fierce determination that move the soldier in Cercas’s novel and 
the pub-goers in Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend are activated by an 
awareness of the contrast between a life stripped of its subjectivity 
(as Deleuze writes of Dickens) and our own subjectivity. The 
responses of these characters are activated by their recognition of 
the struggle for life of the two figures and yet they are dissipated 
immediately afterwards. Again as Deleuze writes of the Dickens 
text: “Everybody bustles about to save him, to the point where, in 
his deepest coma, this wicked man himself senses something soft 
and sweet penetrating him. But to the degree that he comes back to 
life, his saviors turn colder, and he becomes once again mean and 
crude” (2001: 28). 
If, however, this momentary commonality had entered into the 
lives of these “saviors” to the point where the sense of their selves 
is modified, and the mass of their responses and their inner order 
reshaped, their special interest for life described by Dickens would 
be lost, and this loss would signify a change of their whole life: they 
would have become different persons. 
I would like to conclude by remarking that in both cases (that 
of the respect of animal nature as an indifferent realm as in Herzog, 
or of human life in the impersonal sense in the examples of Cercas 
and Dickens, and the respect that redefines us in the case of the 
dogs in Coetzee) the moral considerations evoked are nourished by 
reflecting on forms of life. Reflections of a kind that a noble 
tradition – which I will call “rationalist” for want of a better term – 
is unable to pursue because it places the center of morality in a 
realm that is insensitive to the reality of life, to its forms and its 
relations. 
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